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Abstract
Digital repositories, either digital preservation systems
or archival systems, periodically check the integrity of
stored objects to assure users of their correctness. To do
so, prior solutions calculate integrity metadata and re-
quire the repository to store it alongside the actual data
objects. This integrity metadata is essential for regularly
verifying the correctness of the stored data objects. To
safeguard and detect damage to this metadata, prior so-
lutions rely on widely visible media, that is unaffiliated
third parties, to store and provide back digests of the
metadata to verify it is intact. However, they do not ad-
dress recovery of the integrity metadata in case of dam-
age or attack by an adversary. In essence, they do not
preserve this metadata.
We introduce IntegrityCatalog, a system that collects
all integrity related metadata in a single component, and
treats them as first class objects, managing both their
integrity and their preservation. We introduce a treap-
based persistent authenticated dictionary managing arbi-
trary length key/value pairs, which we use to store all in-
tegrity metadata, accessible simply by object name. Ad-
ditionally, IntegrityCatalog is a distributed system that
includes a network protocol that manages both corrup-
tion detection and preservation of this metadata, using
administrator-selected network peers with two possible
roles. Verifiers store and offer attestations on digests and
have minimal storage requirements, while preservers ef-
ficiently synchronize a complete copy of the catalog to
assist in recovery in case of a detected catalog compro-
mise on the local system. We describe our prototype
implementation of IntegrityCatalog, measure its perfor-
mance empirically, and demonstrate its effectiveness in
real-world situations, with worst measured throughput of
approximately 1K insertions per second, and 2K verified
search operations per second.
1 Introduction
Digital repositories, either digital preservation systems
or simply archival systems, store a series of objects for
the long term. The former, in particular, are expected to
preserve their contents for centuries. A user of such a
system can request a stored object a long time after its
ingestion into the archive, and expect to obtain an intact
copy of the object.
There are two key challenges a digital repository has
to tackle to provide assurances to its users regarding the
integrity of its stored objects. The first is the physical
degradation of the storage media, disk drives typically,
that can result in bit rot and silent corruption. The sec-
ond is an adversary, external or internal, that wishes to
silently alter the content of the stored objects, in an at-
tempt, for example, to rewrite history.
These challenges have been studied and solutions have
been proposed, e.g. [13, 15, 17, 27, 40]. Many of these
solutions generate integrity information for each object
(such as a digest produced by a hash function), collect it
in a separate file (integrity metadata file), and require the
digital repository to store this extra file alongside the ac-
tual object. The system then verifies the integrity of the
data objects stored by calculating fresh hashes of the ob-
jects and comparing them with the associated metadata
file. To ensure the integrity metadata is itself tamper-
evident, these systems typically aggregate a series of
such metadata files into an authenticated data structure
and publish a digest of this structure in a widely visible
medium, such as a newspaper or a Usenet newsgroup.
This approach is insufficient for two reasons. First,
introducing the use of integrity metadata to verify and
preserve data objects creates the recursive issue that in-
tegrity metadata must itself be preserved too. Thus, it is
not enough to simply make it tamper-evident; there must
also be a mechanism to recover damaged, compromised,
or deleted integrity metadata. A trivial example of an at-
tack to silently alter content is the following: an attacker
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with access to the file system deletes a series (or all) of
the integrity metadata files, and then proceeds to change
the few files he is interested in, rendering the repository
unable to detect the exact damage caused.
Second, offloading integrity digests to third parties
(e.g., Usenet) is not future-proof. In the long run, the or-
ganization storing the integrity metadata summaries may
go out of business, become unavailable, or simply stop
cooperating. For example, in the case of Usenet, there
is no long-term guarantee that the company storing and
maintaining the Usenet newsgroup now will continue to
store integrity token summaries intact for the long term.
To truly safeguard this metadata summary, one must dis-
tribute this information to multiple nodes, ideally in sep-
arate administrative domains, and develop a protocol that
manages the distribution of integrity summaries.
In this paper, we describe the design, implementation,
and evaluation of IntegrityCatalog, a system that can be
integrated into any digital repository. IntegrityCatalog
takes a holistic approach. It treats integrity metadata as
first-class objects and serves as a tool that ensures that
the integrity of the metadata themselves is preserved,
verified regularly, and recovered in case of damage or
adversarial attack.
IntegrityCatalog stores and manages all integrity
metadata indexed and accessible by object name, alle-
viating the need for the digital repository to maintain
and manage extra information alongside its data objects.
It uses an authenticated data structure for its storage
needs that is persistent and tamper-evident. Addition-
ally, IntegrityCatalog is a distributed system that includes
a network protocol that manages both corruption detec-
tion and recovery of integrity metadata using a set of
administrator-selected network peers. These peers have
two possible roles. Verifiers store and offer attestations
on integrity tokens and have minimal storage require-
ments, while preservers efficiently synchronize a com-
plete copy of the Catalog to assist in recovery in case of
a catalog compromise on the local system. This approach
allows careful selection of the entities the repository ad-
ministrator entrusts to serve as verifiers and preservers.
The repository administrator has the flexibility to choose
as many remote network peers as possible to serve as
verifiers and preservers. This will minimize the risk of a
powerful adversary compromising the majority of peers,
and forcing the use of corrupt integrity information. The
administrator can also change the selection of network
peers over time as they become unavailable.
To implement IntegrityCatalog, we create a new, disk-
based, tree-backed, authenticated data structure, called
TreapPAD. This data structure is persistent, as it allows
snapshots (of integrity metadata in our case) to be taken
at arbitrary intervals and ensures that values in previous
snapshots remain intact for the lifetime of the tree. It
is optimized for small size, and also allows customiza-
tion to further reduce its size, by skipping authenticator
caching at different depths for different snapshots, recal-
culating them on the spot as needed.
Our approach is simple, efficient and robust. It is sim-
ple because in contrast to existing solutions, it aggregates
all integrity information into a single (but persistent) cat-
alog. It is efficient, because IntegrityCatalog verifies the
complete data structure once, by going out on the net-
work to verify its root authenticator, and then provides
unlimited searches of digests within the Catalog for ver-
ification of stored data objects without requiring addi-
tional network communication. Finally, it is robust be-
cause the catalog is distributed by design to avoid single
points of trust and failure, and is never used without prior
verification.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
• We describe the design and implementation of In-
tegrityCatalog, a system that can be used as a tool
by digital repositories to protect, preserve, and re-
cover integrity tokens in case of damage or adver-
sarial attack.
• We introduce TreapPAD, a disk-based persistent au-
thenticated dictionary, optimized for size, with the
ability to shrink it further by skipping caching of
authenticators.
• We describe the design and implementation of a
protocol for efficiently distributing IntegrityCatalog
snapshots to enable preservation and verification of
integrity tokens at remote nodes.
• We empirically measure the performance of our
IntegrityCatalog prototype using real-world data
and show that insertions into the catalog and
searches/retrievals of object digests from the cata-
log are efficient. Our experiments show worst mea-
sured performance of approximately 1K insertions
per second, and search throughput of 2K verified
queries per second, when using an SSD device to
store the catalog.
2 Background
Cryptographic hash functions [31, 28] map a message
of arbitrary length to a fixed size digest, with proper-
ties such as pre-image and collision resistance. Authen-
ticated data structures use cryptographic hash functions
to represent a data collection with a fixed-size authenti-
cator. A proof for a membership claim, along with an
authenticator, can be used by an external entity to verify
the claim.
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Merkle introduced the hash tree (or Merkle-tree)
in [29], which is thought to be the first authenticated data
structure. Here, the digest of each data element is hashed
to produce a leaf node of a balanced tree with a fixed fan-
out. The inner nodes of the tree are the result of hashing
the digests produced at the lower level. With this orga-
nization, the root digest identifies the entire collection
of data items uniquely (it is the authenticator), with the
assumption that the above properties hold for the crypto-
graphic function used to produce the digests. The proof
for a membership claim consists of all digests needed to
re-produce the root digest, in the path from the data ele-
ment in question to the root.
Persistence in data structures was studied by Driscoll
et al. in [12]. The idea is to have a linked structure (ba-
sically a tree) where changes never overwrite the older
versions and one can access any previous version’s val-
ues at will.
A Persistent Authenticated Dictionary (PAD) [3] com-
bines authenticated dictionaries (search trees with associ-
ated values) with persistence. Our TreapPAD data struc-
ture is a disk-based implementation of a PAD.
3 System description
3.1 Requirements
Integrity metadata is an essential component of many
digital repositories as they perform verification of stored
data objects by periodically calculating the hashes of
these objects and comparing them with the associated in-
tegrity tokens. We treat integrity metadata as first class
objects and propose IntegrityCatalog as a tool that en-
sures that the integrity of the metadata themselves is ver-
ified regularly, preserved, and recovered in case of dam-
age or adversarial attack.
The design of IntegrityCatalog system must fulfill the
following requirements:
• the system should provide a succinct representation
of all data objects in the digital repository and assist
the repository in regularly verifying the integrity of
the stored data objects
• the system should provide the repository with the
modification history of any object
• the system should not require the digital repository
to maintain any additional information, and thus it
should allow access to integrity metadata by object
identifier
• the system should manage and store all integrity
metadata in a persistent, authenticated, and tamper-
evident manner
• the system should be efficient; insertion into and
retrieval of metadata from the Catalog should be
fast, as digital repositories often exhibit high ingress
rates
• the Catalog should not be stored solely on the repos-
itory, as an attacker could modify data objects and
integrity metadata to match, and thus alter the con-
tent of data objects without being detected; the sys-
tem should be able to recover the catalog to a prior
consistent state in case of damage
• to avoid dependence on a single point of trust or ad-
ministration, digests of the Catalog should be dis-
tributed to multiple nodes regularly and in an effi-
cient manner
• the system should not require storage of long-term
secrets, making it suitable for use in the digital
preservation domain
3.2 Threat model
Our primary goal is to protect the persistent state of a dig-
ital repository. As such, we assume an adversary that can
gain access to a local node of the digital repository and
alter its on disk data files. We also assume the adversary
is able to do the same at some percentage of the remote
peers (verifiers, preservers), who attest to the integrity of
the local catalog. We present thresholds for the number
of remote peers that can be controlled by the adversary
in section 3.5. We do assume however, the attacker can-
not block network communication between honest nodes
indefinitely.
We assume the attacker cannot replace running or
stored code silently; using Java and its code signing, for
example, would prohibit this. We also rely on the host
system (the digital repository), to provide for authenti-
cated communication channels, using some kind of PKI.
Because of this, we assume the adversary cannot com-
municate over said channels freely; using a pass-phrase
for the local private key and providing it only when start-
ing verified applications would prohibit this.
3.3 IntegrityCatalog overview
IntegrityCatalog enables a node to manage the associa-
tion of a locally stored object (with a unique identifier)
with the digest of its contents. The collection of asso-
ciations between locally stored objects and their digests
forms a persistent authenticated dictionary that can be
represented by its root authenticator. We use TreapPAD,
a data structure we introduce, to manage this collection.
The contents of this collection are protected by tak-
ing snapshots at frequent intervals and publishing a suc-
cinct token, representing the entire collection of locally
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stored objects, to administrator-selected peers on the net-
work. The form of this token is <snapshot id, snap-
shot authenticator>, where snapshot id is an ever in-
creasing number identifying the current snapshot, and
snapshot authenticator is its corresponding authentica-
tor. Some of these peers, pre-selected by the adminis-
trator, are expected to further contact the local node and
preserve the full contents of IntegrityCatalog for future
recovery in case of damage or attack. The system is op-
timized to minimize the interactions for preservation to
a minimum, by allowing only pages modified since the
last preservation operation to be transferred.
The host system using IntegrityCatalog is expected to
verify the catalog once, before using it to access object
digests. IntegrityCatalog contacts its peers and verifies
the authenticator of the latest snapshot, thus certifying
the entire collection is intact. From this point on, Integri-
tyCatalog provides verified replies without any further
external network communication.
Figure 1 shows the layout of information in the run-
ning system. Elements are inserted in the tree at the bot-
tom. When a snapshot is taken, TreapPAD’s Root ele-
ment Authenticator is calculated (PRA) and pushed to
the authenticated list, along with a pointer to the tree’s
current root element for this snapshot, and the system
time. This produces a new list authenticator (LA) that
becomes the snapshot authenticator, mentioned above, to
be published to remote peers.
Figure 1: The layout of information in TreapPAD.
3.4 Design details
3.4.1 Integration with the host repository system
IntegrityCatalog requires two lists of peers to be defined
for its operation. The first one is the verifiers list, con-
taining nodes that are willing to store and later provide
back the authenticator of each snapshot of the catalog.
This information is small (a few dozens of bytes for
each snapshot) imposing minimal storage requirements
to nodes with the role of verifier.
The second one is the preservers list, which should be
a subset of the verifiers, and contains nodes willing to
store and potentially provide back the full contents of the
catalog itself. As this is an ever growing data structure,
its storage requirements are more significant than those
ones imposed on the verifiers for the storage of the snap-
shot authenticators.
The choice of nodes to act as preservers and verifiers
is left to the administrator of the digital repository. Ad-
ministrators have the flexibility to choose network nodes
they trust, and to change the set of selected nodes over
time, in accordance with the repository’s security policy.
The host system (i.e., the digital repository) can ask
the catalog to store the digest of an object. This digest
is expected to be calculated and formatted by the host
system itself. The information given to IntegrityCatalog
is an identifier to serve as a key and a free format se-
quence of characters (containing the digest) to serve as
a value. The identifier is again treated as an arbitrary
string, which may contain an object name, an object ver-
sion or anything else appropriate for the underlying sys-
tem.
The host system can terminate the current epoch of the
catalog at intervals it defines itself (e.g. every day). This
is achieved by invoking the sealCatalog operation. This
operation takes a snapshot of the catalog and produces
a new <snapshot_id, snapshot_authenticator>
pair. It then proceeds to publish this pair to the nodes
in the verifiers list and waits for their acknowledgments.
Once enough nodes have stored this information, the sys-
tem considers the sealCatalog operation finished and no-
tifies the host application about the result of the oper-
ation. In case of error, the host application is instead
notified with the failure.
We expect the host system to periodically use In-
tegrityCatalog to help it check the integrity of the ob-
jects it manages. To do so, it requests the stored in-
tegrity information and compares it with freshly re-
calculated hashes from the stored object data. Be-
fore reading the catalog, it is expected to invoke once
the verifyCatalog operation. This operation requests
the nodes in the verifiers list to transmit back the
latest <snapshot_id, root_authenticatort> pair
each one has stored for the current node. Integrity-
Catalog gathers all messages and tallies the replies by
snapshot_id and digest. It makes sure a minimum
quorum of verifiers have replied, and tests that a winning
threshold of verifiers have sent replies matching the local
latest known snapshot’s digest (see sections 3.5 and 4.2
for details).
If the result of verification is successful, the host sys-
tem can repeatedly query the catalog for the digest of
any stored object to verify its integrity, without gener-
ating any further network communication. Before any
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reply to such queries is provided, IntegrityCatalog veri-
fies it produces the same (already verified) root digest of
the current snapshot, by rebuilding this root digest from
the leaf containing the searched element, all the way up
to the root. This way, any tampering of the stored data
pages of the catalog itself will be detected.
If, however, the verification of the catalog fails, the
host system is expected to initiate the recoverCatalog op-
eration, during which IntegrityCatalog contacts all nodes
in the preservers list to achieve consensus on the latest
available version of the catalog, in a manner similar to
verifyCatalog above. Once IntegrityCatalog decides on
a version, it selects at random one of the nodes maintain-
ing the version and requests the initiation of a binary up-
date. IntegrityCatalog then restores the catalog from the
selected node, one snapshot at a time. When finished, it
notifies all nodes in the verifiers list that the latest version
of its catalog has been reset to the restored one. At this
point, the host system is expected to iterate over all data
objects, identify the objects missing from the restored
catalog and register them. The objects in question are
the objects ingested in the local repository after the re-
stored snapshot of the catalog was taken. This function
of the host system can be summarized as follows:
for each object in repository
hash = catalog.get(object.name)
if hash is null
hash = calculateHash(object.data)
catalog.put(object.name,hash)
3.4.2 Change of hash function
Every digital preservation system that uses hash func-
tions for verifying integrity must address the fact that
eventually the specific hash function used will be phased
out, hopefully before it becomes compromised. To facil-
itate this, while also guaranteeing that an attacker can-
not replace the existing digest of an object completely,
IntegrityCatalog provides for an amend operation. This
operation allows the host system to append a new value
to the existing one for a specific object. The result of this
function is that the object is associated with the concate-
nation of the old digest and the new digest supplied. It is
expected that the host system will apply some structure
to the values it puts in the catalog so that, over time, it
can make sense of extracted information. For example, it
can prefix the hash function name to the actual digest
and append a delimiter, such as ’md5:XXXXXX/sha-
1:YYYYYY/sha-256:ZZZZZZ’. In any case, the format
of the value attached to each object identifier is left com-
pletely to the host application. IntegrityCatalog sim-
ply does not allow a value to be overwritten, but only
amended.
In case of object migration, due for example to format
change, our system expects the object to be re-registered,
with a new version identifier. This version identifier is
expected to be part of the object name, thus creating a
new entry in our search tree. The idea is that all different
formats exist in the catalog under different names, and
most probably in different catalog snapshots.
3.4.3 Time-stamping
Finally, IntegrityCatalog timestamps each snapshot with
the current system time. This timestamp is protected by
the same snapshot authenticator as any other data, and
is used to answer modification history questions by the
following approach. The latest change of an object is
identified by the snapshot id attached to the current value
as it is stored in the latest version of the catalog (called
latest sid). This may be, for example, the latest update
due to hash function change. This snapshot id is used
to obtain the timestamp of this snapshot and provide the
approximate time of latest change to this object. After
that, this object is looked up in the catalog as it existed
in the snapshot before latest sid. If it did exist, we ob-
tain the snapshot id of its previous change, for which the
timestamp can again be obtained. This procedure is re-
peated until the object cannot be found before some ar-
bitrary snapshot id, which represents its time of ingest.
The granularity of this approach is the period between
snapshots, which we consider sufficient for the long-term
perspective of a digital repository.
TreapPAD can easily be extended to maintain a set of
values instead of a single one, for each element, making
this set of values tamper-evident. These values could in-
clude further metadata, like the exact creation timestamp,
file size, author, etc. We did not implement this feature
as we opted for simplicity in the interface with the host
system.
3.5 Assurances
The basic principle behind IntegrityCatalog’s security
properties is never to trust information read from the lo-
cal disk drives without first verifying it. Whenever a seal
of the catalog is requested, a snapshot of the authenti-
cated dictionary is taken and its root authenticator is cal-
culated. Let’s call this PAD root authenticator (PRA).
This PRA is pushed to the Authenticated List, along with
the current system date and a new List Authenticator (LA)
is produced. The LA, along with the current snapshot id
form the tuple that is pushed to the remote peers. Cor-
respondingly, the verify operation fetches this tuple back
from the remote peers. At this point, IntegrityCatalog
asks the Authenticated List for the membership proof of
the retrieved snapshot id and verifies the extracted list au-
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thenticator against the one retrieved from the network. If
this succeeds, it also extracts from the membership proof
the PRA for the current snapshot, without accessing the
disk again, leaving no window for an adversary to alter
the on-disk data structures. It then returns these elements
(snapshot id, LA, PRA) to the application.
When the application tries to retrieve the security to-
ken of an object as it is stored in the catalog, it also pro-
vides the retrieved snapshot id and PRA. IntegrityCata-
log will obtain the tree’s root element for the specified
snapshot, from the authenticated list, and proceed to ask
the PAD for the proof of membership for the requested
element. It will verify the proof against the provided PRA
and extract from the proof the security token as it was
stored from the repository, along with the id of the epoch
(snapshot) it was stored. Again, no further disk access is
performed with no window of vulnerability.
The same approach is used when requesting the his-
tory of changes for an object, as the snapshot id, security
token, and timestamp of the snapshot are read from the
membership proofs, after these are verified against the
ones retrieved from the remote peers.
To summarize, IntegrityCatalog simplifies the man-
agement of integrity information in a digital repository,
and provides the following assurances:
1. If object data is corrupted, but catalog data is not,
the corruption will be detected in the next integrity
check performed by the repository.
2. If catalog data is corrupted (arbitrary data pages
get corrupted or purposefully modified but without
propagating the change in the hash tree), this cor-
ruption will be detected on the first catalog search
operation that accesses the corrupt data pages, rais-
ing an error. This detection will happen either be-
cause the page will be damaged and the internal tree
algorithms will fail, or because the validation of the
root digest, performed by IntegrityCatalog before
returning the result, will fail. At this point, we ex-
pect the host system to initiate a recoverCatalog op-
eration to restore an intact copy of the catalog.
3. If IntegrityCatalog’s data is modified in a non de-
structive way (from an attacker, maintaining the
hash tree structure), its root authenticator will
change (assumption from the definition of crypto-
graphic hash functions). This change will be de-
tected in the next verifyCatalog operation from the
peers’ attestation.
4. Regarding misbehavior of remote nodes, we as-
sume they can display arbitrary behavior and the
attacker may control and coordinate some of these
nodes. Depending on the policy selected by the
administrator of the digital repository, different as-
surances can be achieved from our network pro-
tocol. The verifyCatalog operation collects tuples
of the form <snapshot id, root authenticator, num-
ber of votes>, which are passed along with the cur-
rent <snapshot id, root authenticator> data from
the catalog’s tree to a policy-based checker.
An attacker wishing to enforce an illegitimate
change in an object, will first need to break into the
digital repository and alter the object’s contents and
the catalog’s corresponding entries. Additionally,
he will need to control enough nodes in the verifiers
set that will: a) force a big enough quorum, to pass
the quorum test, and b) force an altered catalog’s au-
thenticator to win the voting. That is, he will need
to ensure the following two inequalities hold:
veri f iers− absentees
veri f iers > quorum%
(1a)
subverted > winning%∗ (veri f iers− absentees)
(1b)
where absentees represents the number of faulty
non participating nodes, subverted is the number of
faulty participating nodes, quorum% and winning%
are the percentages selected by the current policy,
and veri f iers is the number of verifiers. Inequality
(1a) holds when the attacker passes the quorum test
(we assume he can prevent nodes from participat-
ing in the voting process), while (1b) holds when he
controls the majority of votes. Concluding, as long
as the attacker cannot enforce inequality (1b) above,
he cannot force the use of corrupt catalog informa-
tion from network peers.
3.6 Limitations
Even with all the assurances IntegrityCatalog provides,
two windows of vulnerability remain for an attacker to
modify an object’s content and go unnoticed. The first
one is on ingress, while the current catalog epoch is still
open. Before taking the snapshot and publishing the cat-
alog’s authenticator to its peers, an attacker that has taken
over the local node can alter both the object and its digest
stored in IntegrityCatalog (e.g., via direct binary modifi-
cation of the catalog’s on disk image). One solution for
this is to shrink the window between snapshots, at the ex-
pense of increasing the amount of network traffic as well
as the storage requirements for the nodes in the verifiers
list.
Additionally, an adversary can attack immediately af-
ter a recovery of the catalog. Assuming an object was
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initially registered in a recent snapshot, and this snapshot
has not yet propagated to the preservers, the attacker can
corrupt the catalog and wait for the recovery of a pre-
vious version of it, where the target object was not yet
included. The attacker can then modify the object be-
fore the host system re-registers it in the catalog; this will
result in the object being registered with the wrong (al-
tered) contents. This way however, the attacker can only
target fairly recent objects. Otherwise, he would need to
control several nodes in the preservers list, to be able to
enforce a version of the catalog old enough to not include
an older object.
4 Implementation
4.1 TreapPAD
The IntegrityCatalog prototype is implemented in Java
without any external library dependencies.
Initially, we build a variable length record manager,
based on the approach from [45]. The basic idea is to use
fixed-length blocks to efficiently manage variable length
entities, which in our case correspond to the nodes of our
tree based PAD. Then, we build our persistent authen-
ticated dictionary over a deterministic treap, which is a
randomized search tree [38]. We replace the random pri-
ority of the randomized tree, with the hash value of the
key, making it deterministic. We choose this data struc-
ture over Red-Black or AVL trees, even though the latter
are better balanced, because of its set-uniqueness prop-
erty; i.e., the fact that no matter in which order one adds
the elements, the resulting tree is the same. We need this
property for our efficient network synchronization.
We build partial persistence in our treap using a
bounded fat node with node copy on overflow. More
specifically, we maintain all persistence information in
the tree node until the node expands in size over the max-
imum entry size of our variable length storage manager.
At that point, we copy the node and fix the path from
the root accordingly. That is, instead of bounding the
node over a fixed number of elements for each of the left
pointer, right pointer, value, and authenticator placehold-
ers, we choose to bound the complete structure over its
total size, while it fits in our lower level storage mech-
anism. Our bounded fat node approach is size optimal,
as key/value pairs are infrequently copied; in contrast,
in node-copy approaches to persistence, multiple copies
would be generated resulting in increased size of the data
structure.
Using these primitives, we build our TreapPAD which
can store all entries requested by the repository, and also
take snapshots when requested. These snapshots cause a
new set of authenticators to be generated for each entry
that was newly inserted, as well as all of its ancestors.
This generates a lot of authenticators for each snapshot,
especially for entries near the root of the tree. Here, a
trade-off arises. While at one extreme, every authen-
ticator could be cached , these entries are actually op-
tional and can be recalculated at will, with the corre-
sponding computing speed cost. At the other extreme,
one can avoid caching authenticators altogether, at the
cost of significant recalculation effort for each attempt
to access these authenticators (while building member-
ship proofs). We introduce the authenticator cache selec-
tive storage subsystem to manage this trade-off, by se-
lectively caching authenticators at different depths of the
tree. This subsystem can be initialized with a single inte-
ger skip number that works as follows. A skip number of
0 implies storing all authenticators. Any other positive
number is used along with the current snapshot number
(1-based) and depth (0-based) to calculate whether the
current authenticator should be cached (stored) using the
following formula:
depth mod skip no = (snapshot− 1) mod skip no
For example, if skip no is 3, the first snapshot has authen-
ticators cached at nodes of depth 0, 3, 6, ...; the second
snapshot at depths 1, 4, 7, ..., and so forth. With this ap-
proach, a skip number of i may result in recalculation of
up to 2i missing authenticators. We measure and present
this attribute’s impact on performance in Section 5.
Additionally, we need an authenticated list to track
the pointer to the current root node, the root authenti-
cator, and the current timestamp for each snapshot. We
use the Authenticated Append-Only Skip List (AASL)
from [26], to do so.
Finally, we enable efficient synchronization of a tree
with an existing previous version of it. This allows us to
propagate IntegrityCatalog’s underlying data structures
to selected peers on the network efficiently, as we de-
scribe in the network operations of Section 4.2. The
TreapPAD interface includes the following methods to
allow for this synchronization:
• getFirstBlockOfSnapshot(long snapshot) →
<blockNumber, blockData>
• getNextBlockOfSnapshot(long snapshot, long
blockNumber)→ <blockNumber, blockData>
• binaryUpdateBegin(long snapshot)
• binaryUpdateBlock(long snapshot, long block-
Number, MemoryBuffer blockData)
• binaryUpdateCommit(long snapshot)
To explain, assume an application that has access to
two trees, one called updated and the other stale, with
obvious roles. The application will start by asking the
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updated tree for the first block of the next snapshot af-
ter the latest of the stale tree (getFirstBlockOfSnapshot).
It will initiate an update operation on the stale tree (bi-
naryUpdateBegin) and update it with the retrieved block
(binaryUpdateBlock). It will then ask the updated tree
for the next block (getNextBlockOfsnapshot) until it re-
ceives an End-of-Data reply, at which point it will con-
clude updates to the stale tree (binaryUpdateCommit). It
will continue this update loop for any snapshots existing
at the updated tree and not yet present on the stale one,
until the last one is processed. At this point, the stale tree
will be semantically equal to the updated one.
4.2 IntegrityCatalog
IntegrityCatalog exposes a single class named Cata-
log that provides access to all described functionality
via its exposed methods. The basic operations, such
as put(key, value), amend(key, new_value), and
get(key) are self explanatory. We now describe the
seal, verify, recover, and preserve methods.
seal: The seal() method terminates the current
epoch of the catalog and notifies verifiers. Initially,
it derives a new snapshot. After that, it sends a
StoreMessage to each Node in the verifiers list, car-
rying the new snapshot id and its root authenticator. Fi-
nally, it sets a timeout to limit the time window for arrival
of the replies. Each receiving Node is expected to store
this information and reply with a StoreReplyMessage.
Additionally, if the verifier node is also a preserver,
it is expected to schedule a remote catalog preserva-
tion asynchronous operation (explained in detail below)
to preserve the current version of the catalog. Each
StoreReplyMessage that arrives at the current node is
collected; once all nodes have replied or the timeout has
passed, the system counts all positive replies and decides
on the success of the operation, based on the defined quo-
rum percent. The function used to decide the result is
replaceable by the host system and, as such, a custom
policy may be implemented. Finally, the host system is
notified with the seal operation’s result.
verify: The verify() method verifies the stored cat-
alog contents are intact. The host application is expected
to call it before looping through its local objects and ac-
cessing the get() function repeatedly to perform integrity
checking of its locally stored data objects. Initially it
sends a StoredVersionRequestMessage to each Node
in the verifiers list and sets an appropriate timeout. Each
receiving node is expected to access its local registry
of stored <snapshot_id, root_authenticator> to-
kens for the requesting catalog and reply with the most
recent one via a StoredVersionReplyMessage. The
local node collects these replies, aggregates them by
<snapshot_id, root_authenticator> and passes
them to the policy based function, along with the
current tree snapshot and digest. This function will
reply with either success or failure. Our default
policy decides success when the quorum is greater
than 50% of the number of verifiers, and the current
<snapshot_id,root_authenticator>has received a
minimum of 70% of the votes of this quorum. Again, the
host application is notified of the result.
recover: The recover() method restores the cat-
alog to a previous stable version. The host applica-
tion should invoke it only when the catalog is consid-
ered damaged, as it will result in the complete replace-
ment of the local catalog with the latest available ver-
sion from one of the preserving nodes. This operation
takes place in three consecutive asynchronous phases.
In the first phase, a RecoverVersionRequestMessage
is sent to each Node in the preservers list. Each re-
ceiving node is expected to access the actual catalog it
preserves for the calling node, obtain the latest avail-
able snapshot id and its accompanying root authentica-
tor and send it via the RecoverVersionReplyMessage.
The originating node will gather all replies and decide
on the latest version to restore, in a manner similar to
the one described in the verify function. Our default
implementation will choose the version with more than
70% of the replies, with a minimum quorum size of
50% of the number of preservers. It will then pick at
random one of the nodes maintaining the selected ver-
sion and start the second phase, the actual catalog re-
covery. It will send a RecoverBeginMessage to the
selected node, starting with the first snapshot id, while
also recreating the local catalog from scratch. The re-
ceiving node will retrieve the first available block for
the given snapshot of the preserved remote tree and re-
ply with it via a RecoverDataMessage. The local node
will update its catalog with the received data and then
continue with a RecoverGetNextMessage until it re-
ceives a RecoverEndOfData message. At this point, it
will increase the snapshot id and restart this phase until
the catalog arrives at the target snapshot id. Once this
goal is achieved, at phase three, it will verify the cata-
log’s current authenticator against the expected one and
send a VersionResetMessage to all verifiers, instruct-
ing them to force the latest version to become the one
just restored, regardless of each node’s local registry.
preserve: As already stated, the remote cat-
alog preservation process is initiated when
a remote node (called preserver) receives a
StoredVersionRequestMessage. In this case,
preserver will open the catalog stored locally that
corresponds to origin and retrieve the latest snapshot id.
It will then proceed to send an UpdateBeginMessage
to origin requesting the succeeding snapshot from the
discovered one. Origin will process this message and
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reply with an UpdateDataMessage with the contents
of the corresponding page of its catalog. Preserver
will then send an UpdateGetNextMessage until it
receives an UpdateEndOfDataMessage from origin.
Finally, preserver will repeat this process until the target
snapshot id has been derived.
4.3 Planning for the future
While our solution is modest in its size requirements,
demonstrated to be O(N) in the number of elements of
the PAD in our evaluations, its growth is still constant
over time. After enough years, a single large file may
prove unmanageable as insertion efficiency degrades.
One way to address this is via partitioning at the tree
level; while we have not implemented it yet, we describe
it here for completeness. Basically, instead of having one
TreapPAD component for the catalog, one can employ
k TreapPADs and a partitioning function that, given the
key of the item to insert, assigns it to one of the k trees.
A very simple such function, for k = 256, simply takes
the last binary byte of the hash value of the object’s name
(an operation needed anyway, to calculate the priority for
our treap). During insertion, the partitioning function is
invoked with the key and the insert operation is routed
to the appropriate tree. To take a snapshot of the tree,
a snapshot operation is invoked on each one of the k in-
dependent trees and the root digests are gathered in one
flat authenticated list. This list’s authenticator becomes
the root authenticator for the current snapshot and can be
used on all operations. The main gain from this approach
is the reduction of the k different trees’ depth by a factor
of log2k, resulting in fewer disk accesses. An extra gain
from this partitioning, is the ability to have up to k par-
allel operations (insert or search) running, without intro-
ducing synchronization in TreapPAD’s code, by simply
maintaining k different and parallel operation queues. Of
course, small adjustments will be needed in the preserve
and recover network operations as well.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate IntegrityCatalog’s perfor-
mance. We focus on the performance characteristics of
TreapPAD, as the major IntegrityCatalog operations (in-
sert and search) are dominated by its behavior. In all
tests, we use a single computer with an Intel Core i7-
4820K running at 3.70GHz, 64GB memory, 8 TB of hard
disk data (2 x Western Digital Black Series 4TB, 7200
RPM, no RAID), and 1 TB of SSD (Samsung 840 Evo
Series).
We use real-world data for our tests. Since we expect
our system to be used with file names and web URLs, we
chose to focus on the latter as it is more universal. To this
end, we downloaded the index of the ClueWeb12 data
set of the Lemur project [1] and selected 91.250.000 dis-
tinct URLs from it at random (average URL name length
51, maximum 2K bytes). This number represents a full
year’s worth of crawling (365 days x 250K URLs/day)
for a single busy node of the live LOCKSS [27] net-
work (David Rosenthal, private communications), and
we make the conservative assumption, that every crawled
page has been modified and needs to be inserted in the
archive as a new version.
Our methodology is as follows: we insert 250K URLs
in TreapPAD and then we take a snapshot, simulating
one snapshot per day. At this point, we search for 100K
URLs at random, from the ones already inserted at any
snapshot, simulating a verification of a subset of the
archive. The search time includes the descent into the
tree to locate the element (while also building the proof,
by incorporating all necessary neighbor elements), as
well as to verify the proof against a target root authen-
ticator (recalculating all hashes up to the root). We run
our tests against both a hard disk and a solid state disk.
We also vary our authenticator caching skip factor from 0
(caching all authenticators) to 6 with a step size of 2. For
all our tests, we use a page size of 16KB, a value we de-
rived as optimal via a separate set of micro-benchmarks,
omitted for brevity.
In Figure 4, we present the catalog file size as mea-
sured after each snapshot across different authenticator
caching skip factors. We see size increases linearly with
increasing number of elements, while it also decreases
as we increase the skip factor. In the worst case, after
simulating a year of operations, file size is measured at
45GB, while with a skip factor of 6, it shrinks to 25GB,
almost half the size. For comparison, the text file with all
the URLs used in this experiment is approximately 6GB
in size, which excludes 25 bytes per URL we add repre-
senting the hash value (approximately another 2GBs).
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Figure 2: Average per-element performance of insert, snapshot and search while using a HDD to store the TreapPAD,
varying the authenticator caching skip factor.
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Figure 3: Average per-element performance of insert, snapshot and search, with a skip factor of 0, HDD vs SSD.
In Figure 2(a), we present the average time of inser-
tions when using the hard disk, varying the skip factor.
For the first 65M elements all options perform on par
with sub-millisecond insertion time. At this point, for
skip factors of 0 and 2, the buffer cache of the machine
is exhausted and operations start fetching data from the
hard disk. The other two runs with higher skip factors,
due to their smaller on-disk image, still operate from the
buffer cache. Even when using the disk, the worst in-
sertion time measured is 31 ms. This corresponds to a
throughput of 667 insert ops per second.
In Figure 2(b), we present average snapshot time (the
elapsed time to create a snapshot divided by the num-
ber of new elements added). As with insertions, we
see a similar pattern regarding system buffer cache us-
age while the file size is small enough. The experimen-
tal run storing all authenticators (skip factor=0) exhibits
a steady, sub-linear, decrease in performance with in-
creasing file size. With the disk involved, the maximum
average time is measured at 55 ms, corresponding to a
throughput of 183 snapshotted elements per second. The
run with a skip factor of 2 performs slower after 80M el-
ements, while the other two still operate from the buffer
cache with sub-millisecond average per element speeds.
The performance penalty of increasing the skip fac-
tor is visualized in Figure 2(c), where we plot average
search speed. While increasing the skip factor to 4 de-
creases the search time, as the complete tree file lies in
main memory, with a skip factor of 6 the time actually
increases, as up to 26 non-cached authenticators need to
be recalculated. For skip factors greater than 6, this trend
will increase exponentially. Concluding, a skip factor of
4 seems to indicate a sweet spot that balances size and
speed.
To understand the impact of the hard disk seek time on
our prototype’s performance, we repeat all experiments
on the SSD. We plot average insertion, snapshot, and
search time for HDD and SSD, for the largest file size
with a skip factor of 0, in Figures 3(a) to 3(c) respec-
tively. The figures show a significant improvement in
performance on the SSD, because disk seek time is elim-
inated. With the modest file sizes we presented above, we
conclude it is both feasible and efficient to use an SSD for
IntegrityCatalog. For reference, we list the worst mea-
sured performance in operations per second, in Table 1,
for both HDD and SSD experiments.
Regarding our network protocol, the network traffic
generated for each operation, per node, is presented in
Table 2 where we assume a SHA-1 hash function (with
a digest size 20 bytes). The frequent seal and verify op-
erations are very efficient as only digests travel across
nodes, while the heavier preserve and recover are domi-
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Insert Snapshot Search
SF HDD SSD HDD SSD HDD SSD
0 667 986 183 217 537 1889
2 821 4222 699 1711 601 3321
4 2766 7798 3204 4783 2079 2032
6 6577 8234 3684 4184 534 534
Table 1: Worst measured performance in operations per
second. SF is the authenticator caching skip factor.
operation local remote
seal <100 bytes <100 bytes
verify <100 bytes <100 bytes
preserve snapshot size small (ACK)
recover small (request) catalog size
Table 2: Network traffic generated by the catalog.
nated by the size of the snapshot and tree size they carry,
respectively. For preserve and recover operations, every
network message carries a single tree page. Analyzing a
bit further the 45 GB catalog size (the worst case above),
we see it represents an average 126 MB per snapshot, the
data expected to travel on the wire for a synchronization
operation of an up-to-date preserver node. At a modest
network speed of 10 Mbit/sec, it will take an average of
2 minutes for a (fairly common) snapshot transfer, and
a total of 13 hours for a complete catalog restore in the
(rare) case of a needed recovery.
6 Related work
One way to safeguard the integrity of an object is to use
a Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID) [33, 5,
4, 32] where either full copies are maintained or parity
bits are automatically calculated and stored along with
data, allowing recovery as long as a minimum number of
disks are intact. However, a significant space overhead
is imposed to achieve integrity. Still, this approach helps
repair damage besides detecting it.
Another approach is to calculate a checksum for an
object and store it along with it. To achieve this, one can
use error detecting techniques [19], such as cyclic redun-
dancy checks [34], such as the widely used CRC32 [23].
Although they may be attractive for messages on com-
munication channels and very fast to compute, they are
not appropriate for long term storage, as they do not pro-
vide strong pre-image resistance (an attacker can fairly
easily calculate a second message with the same CRC as
an existing one).
Another alternative for a “summary” function are al-
gebraic formulas that produce signatures [20, 36, 22].
Schwarz et al. [37] proposed their use for proof of re-
mote data possession when the owner no longer holds
the original data. Although potentially faster to calculate
than cryptographic hash functions, they also lack the pre-
image resistance properties required to be applicable to
the long-term digital preservation and archival systems
we target.
Cryptographic hash functions [31], such as SHA-
* [14], may be used to produce strong digests. This is
today the strongest type of summary information that can
be produced, and this is the scheme upon which we build.
Fault-tolerant file systems, such as Oracle’s ZFS [44],
combine many of the above techniques for safe-guarding
against hard disk drive faults. However, they are not de-
signed to protect against different machine-level faults,
such as main memory errors, as demonstrated in [43].
Moreover, ZFS as well as all above approaches, where all
integrity checking related artifacts are stored locally (ei-
ther multiple copies of an object, or its checksum/digest),
fail when a malicious entity attacks aiming to alter the
existing content unnoticed. The attacker can simply alter
all related elements and the changes will go unnoticed by
any of the above techniques.
A different approach is demonstrated by the
LOCKSS [27] peer-to-peer digital preservation sys-
tem, which assumes multiple nodes store the same
object and uses them for verification (and also for dam-
age repair). This is a valid assumption for this system
as its purpose is to preserve academic journals, that is,
widely visible data. Each node verifies the integrity of
its stored data objects by initiating a poll per object in
which other nodes participate. The participating nodes
need to read and process the complete object to produce
a digest for it. This results in heavy load for the system
as a whole; our approach can complement the existing
polling protocol by allowing each node to verify its own
content. This can reduce the polling rate per object and
thus reduce overall system load.
Haber et al. [17] propose a Content Integrity Service
(CIS) based on hash trees along with hash-linking. The
system defines epochs of operation. At the end of each
epoch, the root digest, which is dependent upon the one
of the previous epoch, becomes the ’witness’ value and
is expected to be safely published to a “widely available
medium”. The CIS scheme was later enhanced by Song
et al. [40] in the ACE system by introducing another
epoch, above the aforementioned one, before generat-
ing the witness value. More specifically, the first epoch,
which is dynamically sized by the system, forms a hash
tree on ingest. Once it is closed, the root value is incor-
porated in a hash-chain for the user-defined period (e.g.
a week) of the second epoch. When this second epoch
closes, the authenticator for this hash chain becomes the
witness value to be published, or in any case preserved
as securely as possible.
The major drawback of the CIS and ACE systems is
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that the repository is asked to safely preserve the mem-
bership proofs for each data element while the integrity
service only maintains hash trees of digests . Thus, the
simplest form of attack for an adversary is to erase the
membership proof of an object, and then proceed to mod-
ify it, leaving the repository unable to verify the object’s
integrity.
To address this, the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) defines a specification [13]
based on Timestamping Authorities (TSA) and a Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (PKI), which addresses both object
integrity and certification of an object’s existence before
a certain point in time. This specification takes into ac-
count the phasing out of underlying algorithms by re-
newing integrity information with newer timestamps ob-
tained with newer keys or from a newer TSA. This solu-
tion however depends on the reliability of the TSAs used,
which now become single points of failure for integrity
information while they also remain outside the control of
the digital preservation system.
Persistence was studied thoroughly by Driscoll et al
in [12]. Maniatis et al used the node copying technique
to introduce a persistent authenticated search tree in [26],
using a multi-key tree (B- Tree), which can be converted
to a dictionary with some additional work. However,
space requirements quickly become prohibitive as any
change in a snapshot requires complete B- Tree page
copies. Anagnostopoulos et al. introduced the Per-
sistent Authenticated Dictionary (PAD) concept in [3],
using a persistent Red-Black tree and node copying.
More recently, in [9, 10] Crosby and Wallach studied
the subject of PADs and suggested different techniques
to implement them, including the treap [38] with its set-
unique property, as well a discussion about authenticator
caching, which influenced our design decisions. How-
ever, this line of work never studied the impact of sec-
ondary memory on these data structures as all experi-
ments were done in main memory.
In our work, we organize all integrity metadata in a
single data structure, addressable by object name. We
ensure this data structure is tamper-evident and we pro-
vide a complete solution to its preservation and recov-
ery, as well as its own integrity checking. This way, the
host digital preservation system does not need to track
any extra information alongside the objects. Addition-
ally, when the host system asks for the integrity informa-
tion of an object (by name), it is assured this informa-
tion is intact. With our TreapPAD, our solution is space
efficient, growing linearly with the number of elements
in the dictionary, while also giving solutions to manag-
ing the caching of authenticators. Finally, our approach
does not directly use a PKI; however it does need secure
message delivery to and from the nodes comprising the
verifiers and preservers lists. It is up to the host system to
choose the right method for message authentication and
integrity checks, however it does not have to store any
secrets along the objects for the long term.
Our system is complementary to digital preservation
and distributed storage systems and may be used as a
tool by each storage node in the system to proactively
verify the integrity of its contents. As such, it is more
suitable to systems where the complete file is stored in
different nodes, such as LOCKSS [27], FreeNet [6], Far-
Site [2], and Publius [42]. Systems that break files in
pieces, such as Venti [35], OceanStore [24], CFS [11],
Pastiche [7], Samsara [8], GridSharing [41], PASIS [16],
and Glacier [18] can still use IntegrityCatalog to proac-
tively validate the pieces they own.
Our solution is orthogonal to external audits by the
owner of the objects [25], or by an external auditor [39].
Finally, Muniswamy-Reddy et al. propose provenance
information should be tracked by creating metadata ob-
jects and treating them as first class objects [30]; our
system is complementary to theirs by taking over man-
agement of these metadata objects and assuring their full
preservation. The same can be said for other provenance
tracking systems, such as [21].
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented IntegrityCatalog, a novel dis-
tributed system that can be integrated into digital repos-
itories that use integrity tokens to periodically verify the
correctness of their locally stored data objects. Unlike
prior approaches that focus only on making integrity
metadata tamper-evident, IntegrityCatalog takes a holis-
tic approach. It treats integrity metadata as first-class
objects and provides a distributed network protocol that
ensures that integrity tokens are preserved, verified regu-
larly, and recovered in case of damage or adversarial at-
tack, without requiring storage of long-term secrets. Our
approach uses a new data structure, called TreapPAD,
which provides a persistent, authenticated dictionary of
arbitrary length keys and associated values, that is space
optimal and efficient to synchronize over the network.
Measurements of our prototype after a full year’s worth
of operations, show 1K insertions per second, and 2K
verified searches per second, as worst case performance.
Concluding, we believe IntegrityCatalog will prove
useful to the digital preservation community. As future
work, we plan to extend it to manage more provenance
related information and integrate it with a provenance
tracking system.
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